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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Parker Maloney contends the district court unduly narrowed the scope of its discretion
when it revoked his probation without recognizing it had the authority to rule on his argument
that the sex offender terms of probation imposed by his probation officer were improper. The
State has not attempted to justify the district court’s analysis in that regard.
Rather the State has argued that this Court should affirm the district court’s ultimate
decision on an alternative ground – the district court’s assertion that the propriety of the sex
offender terms was not relevant to the decision to revoke probation. The State is mistaken.
Because the improper terms of probation had impacted Mr. Maloney’s ability to effectively
rehabilitate during the period of probation, the district court’s failure to consider the impropriety
of those improper terms of probation tainted its analysis of whether probation was a viable
sentencing option going forward.
In fact, that sort of concern is precisely why Idaho’s appellate courts have repeatedly held
that, when the district court abuses its discretion in this fashion, the appellate court are to note
the error and remand the case for the district court to make appropriate findings under the
applicable legal standards in the first instance. Since the State’s argument is inconsistent with
this established principle, this Court should reject the State’s argument and follow that precedent
instead.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Maloney’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to consider Mr. Maloney’s
argument that the sex offender terms of probation had undermined his term of probation because
it had erroneously concluded that it could not tell the probation officer how to classify him.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Consider Mr. Maloney’s
Argument That The Sex Offender Terms Of Probation Had Undermined His Term Of Probation
Because It Had Erroneously Concluded That It Could Not Tell The Probation Officer How To
Classify Him
The State has not attempted to justify the district court’s conclusion that it did not have
the authority to assess the propriety of the sex offender terms of probation placed upon
Mr. Maloney by his probation officer. (See generally Resp. Br.) In so doing, it has effectively
conceded the district court erroneously narrowed the scope of its discretion in that respect.
Rather, the State has argued that this Court should ignore that abuse of the district court’s
discretion and affirm the ultimate decision to revoke probation based on the district court’s
assertion that the propriety of the sex offender terms had no impact on that decision. (Resp.
Br., pp.4-6.) The State’s argument is inconsistent with both Idaho Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals precedent, which has repeatedly held that, when the district court abuses its discretion in
this manner, the appellate court should simply remand the case so the district court can
reconsider the motion and make appropriate findings under the proper legal standards. See, e.g.,
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass’n N.D. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 157 Idaho 446, 455 (2014); Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009); State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 437 (Ct. App.
2015); State v. Brashier, 127 Idaho 730, 737 (Ct. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds.
In fact, the rationale for that rule is actually illustrated by Mr. Maloney’s case. The
determination of whether to revoke probation turns on a determination of “whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent
with the protection of society.” State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). When the
terms of probation are unrelated to the underlying crime of conviction, those terms do not
promote the goal of rehabilitation. State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454-55 (1977) (holding a
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term of probation preventing a defendant convicted of forgery from driving a car was not related
to the crime of conviction, and so, not a term reasonably related to the goal of rehabilitation). As
a result, when improper terms of probation are imposed, they distort the district court’s ability to
assess a critical part of the ultimate question – whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation. See id. (proceeding to evaluate the impact of the improper term in regard to the
ultimate decision to revoke probation). 1
Thus, in Mr. Maloney’s case, the improper terms of probation required him to participate
in sex offender treatment programs and subjected him to various other restrictions, none of
which were necessary to promote his rehabilitation for the crime of conviction. In fact, it was his
inability to comply with those unnecessary terms which made up the vast majority of the alleged
probation violations. (See R., pp.121-27, 175-80.) As a result, those unnecessary and improper
terms of probation set him up to fail, and so, detracted from, rather than promoted, the goal of
rehabilitation. Therefore, before it could properly revoke his probation even on a violation of a
non-sex-offender term of probation, the district court needed to consider whether a period of
probation without the improper sex offender terms would actually promote the goal of
rehabilitation, and so, be a viable option going forward. Ergo, the district court’s failure to
consider the propriety of the sex offender terms of probation tainted its analysis on the

1

To the extent the Mummert Court considered whether, in its opinion, the district court was
likely to weigh the facts the same way on remand, the appellate court was essentially weighing
the facts itself. See Mummert, 98 Idaho at 455. However, the Supreme Court has since rejected
that sort of analysis, making it clear that the appellate courts should not be concerned with
weighing the evidence when it finds an abuse of discretion of that sort. Montgomery, 147 Idaho
at 6-7. Rather, since the weighing of the evidence is the district court’s responsibility, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that the appellate courts are supposed to remand the case
regardless of its views on the evidence so that the district court can properly evaluate the motion
by actually making appropriate findings of fact in the first instance in light of the applicable legal
standards. Id.; see also Villavicencio, 159 Idaho at 437 (applying that new standard of review).

4

alternative upon which the State’s argument on appeal relies. As such, this Court should refuse
to affirm the district court’s erroneous analysis on that tainted basis.
Rather, as the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have repeatedly instructed, this Court
should remand this case so the district court can properly exercise its discretion in regard to the
motion to revoke probation and make appropriate findings about the relevant facts under the
applicable legal standards in the first instance.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Maloney respectfully requests this Court vacate the order revoking his probation and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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